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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
EXEMPTIONS FOR DEPENDENTS: THE BURDEN OF
PROOF DILEMMA FOR DIVORCED OR
SEPARATED PARENTS
Plaintiff, divorced and living apart from his former wife who had
custody of their two sons, claimed dependency exemptions' for both
sons in his federal income tax returns for the two years in question.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed the exemption for
one son in each of the two years. In affirming the Commissioner's
determination, the Tax Court held that plaintiff failed to sustain the
burden of proving that his contribution was more than half the total
support of the children.2 Though able to establish the amount of his
contribution, plaintiff could not prove the amount of support from all
other sources, including his former wife. On appeal to the Fourth
Circuit, reversed. Held: To sustain the burden of proof for a claimed
dependency exemption, a taxpayer need not prove the total amount of
support from all sources if he establishes other facts persuasively
indicating that his contribution constituted over half the claimed de-
pendent's aggregate support. Commissioner v. Mendel, 351 F.2d 580
(4th Cir. 1965).
Section 151(e), Internal Revenue Code of 1954, allows a taxpayer
an exemption of $600 apiece for those of his children who receive over
fifty per cent of their total support from him during the calendar year.
Under Tax Court rules of practice4 a taxpayer has the burden of
'INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 151 (e) (1), provides:
An exemption of $600 for each dependent (as defined in section 152)-
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 152 (a) states:[T]he term "dependent" means any of the following individuals over half
of whose support ... was received from the taxpayer ... (1) A son or daughter
of the taxpayer....
'Walter H. Mendel. 41 T.C. 32 (1956).
'24 J. TAXATION 50 (1966).
'Rule 32 of Rules of Practice of the Tax Court, 26 CFR § 701.32 provides:
The burden of proof shall be upon the petitioner, except as otherwise provided
by statute, and except that in respect of any new matter pleaded in his answer, it
shall be upon the respondent.
The Code imposes the burden of proof upon the Commissioner on issues of trans-
feree liability, § 6902(a) ; and intent to evade tax in civil fraud actions, § 7454(a).
Rule 32 applies only to Tax Court cases, although it has been applied in district
court cases to assessments made by the Commissioner. 9 MERTEs, LAw OF FEDERALI,
IxcomE TAXATION § 50.61 n.98 (1943).
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proving his right to a claimed exemption' by a preponderance of the
evidence.6 The Tax Court has repeatedly held that it cannot make
the percentage computation contemplated by the statute unless it
knows the total amount of child support from all sources, as well as
the amount contributed by the taxpayer.' The principal case repre-
sents a departure from this rule in the case of a divorced husband
who is prevented from claiming exemptions, to which he might other-
wise be entitled, because of inability to prove the support contri-
bution of his estranged wife with whom the dependents live.8
The court in the principal case noted that proof of the total amount
of support received by the claimed dependents was a crucial fact in
most cases,9 but that the Code itself did not expressly require such
proof." Although plaintiff was unable to establish the amount of his
former wife's contribution, the court held that he had met the con-
tribution requirement by showing that his sons were young, modestly
dressed, had no extraordinary medical or education expenses, and
together received annually from him approximately one thousand five
hundred dollars support. Without explanation, the court stated that
' In addition to Rule 32, a taxpayer faces the obstacle that deductions are a
matter of legislative grace, and qualification is dependent upon strict compliance
with the Code. 2 CASEY, FEDERAL TAX PRAcTIcE § 7.9 (1955).
A taxpayer also faces a presumption that the Commissioner's determination is
prima facie correct. Unless this determination is palpably erroneous, arbitrary,
or capricious, a petitioner must produce competent evidence to rebut the pre-
sumption, regardless of the difficulty in producing such evidence. The burden of
proof remains on the petitioner even after he has introduced sufficient evidence to
overcome the presumption. Baiter, Rules of Evidence Applicable in Proceedings
before the Tax Court of the United States: Burden of Proof and Presumptions.
6 MAPQUETTE UNivnRsiTY INSTITUTE ON TAXATION 1 (1956).
89 MRTENS, op. cit. supra note 4, § 50.62.7 Zacker, ff 53,275 P-H Tax Ct Mem., at 834 (1953):
The petitioner did not offer evidence as to what the total support of the
children was, and it is not possible for us to make a finding ... [that the
husband's payments] constituted half the support. ...
Accord, Weidler, f[ 55,130 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. (1955); Kessler, ff 55,203 P-H Tax
Ct Mem. (1955) (husband's unsupported opinion of actual total support in-
sufficient); McDevitt, 1 54,068 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. (1954) (evidence of support
costs in prior years insufficient); Banzhaf, ff 53,294 P-H Tax Ct Miem. (1953)
(unsupported testimony concerning wife's income and support contribution, and
state court support order insufficient).
'See Clurman, Exemptions for Dependents, 21 J. TAXATION 306 (1964); Lago-
marcino, The Divorced Husband and the Dependency Exemptiont Mirage, 12 TAX
L. REV. 85 (1957).
'The court cited Kennedy v. Commissioner, 339 F.2d 335 (7th Cir. 1964);
Fearing v. Commissioner, 315 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1963) ; Tressler v. Commissioner,
206 F.2d 538 (4th Cir. 1953).
"°But see, Treas. Reg. § 1.152-1 (a) (2) (i) (1957), as amended, T.D. 6441, 1960-1
Cum. BULL. 51, which provides:
For purposes of determining whether or not an individual received ... over
half of his support from the taxpayer, there shall be taken into account the
amount of support received from the taxpayers as compared to the entire
amount of support which the individual received from all sources....
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the principal case was like two Tax Court cases, Theodore Milgroom"
and E. R. Cobb, Sr.,'2 in which exemption was allowed without proof
of a divorced wife's support contribution. The court also stated -with-
out criticism that Bernard C. Rivers," on which the Tax Court in
the principal case relied, was distinguishable. While allowing the
exemption without a showing of total amount of support, the court
also approved of other circuit court decisions' 4 which followed the
general rule requiring proof of the total amount, without giving an
explanation for the exception to this rule made in the principal case.
By recognizing the possibility of a taxpayer proving his right to
dependency exemptions without necessarily showing total support,
the principal case provides some measure of relief for taxpayers facing
the persisting burden of proof dilemma. The court's failure, however,
to give any explanation in its decision other than a recitation of
facts, leaves uncertain the full scope of this exception to the usual
proof requirement. The decision implies that this exception will benefit
few taxpayers since cases before the Tax Court seldom correspond
with the factual situation in Mendel.
In those cases following the general rule, proof of total support
was needed because, unlike Mendel, one or more of the following
circumstances were present: plaintiff established no other evidence
than the amount of his contribution;"1 the evidence was unpersuasive,
without a showing of total support, that a contribution met the re-
quired amount;' 6 there was contradictory evidence in the record;
substantial support payments of an unascertained amount from other
31 T.C. 1256 (1959).
128 T.C. 595 (1957). In neither Milgroom nor Cobb did the divorced husband
prove total support for his children. As in the principal case, however, the
husband presented sufficient facts to persuade the Tax Court that he had con-
tributed more than one half his children's support. Cobb recognized the husband's
burden of proof dilemma, but neither decision mentioned that it was deviating
from the general rule requiring proof of total support. Milgroom and Cobb were
not cited by the Tax Court in the principal case.
"33 T.C. 935 (1960). In Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930),
the court held that once a taxpayer's right to a deduction was established the
amount of the deduction could be determined by approximation. The court in
Rivers, a dependency exemption case, refused to apply the Cohan principle of
approximation to determine a taxpayer's right to an exemption by approximating
the dependent's total support. Since the right to the dependency exemption was
contingent upon the total amount of support, Cohan could not apply. This holding
is inapplicable when, as in Mendel, proof of total support is unnecessary to
establish an exemption right.
" See note 9 supra.
"Kennedy v. Commissioner, 339 F.2d 335 (7th Cir. 1964); Tressler v. Com-
missioner, 206 F.2d 538 (4th Cir. 1953) ; Kessler, ff 55,203 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. (1955).
"Fearing v. Commissioner, 315 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1963); Weidler, 1 55,130 P-H
Tax Ct. Mlem. (1955).
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sources were shown; and plaintiff's contribution had to be allocated
between dependents and nondependents.' 7
Several other approaches exist to that normally taken in deter-
mining whether the taxpayer's contribution meets the fifty percent
support test. The court in the principal case could have compared
the taxpayer's contribution with various governmental statistics in-
dicating average costs of support for the number of dependents claim-
ed. 8 If the taxpayer's contribution equalled or exceeded one half of
the average support cost, a presumption could arise that the support
test had been met, the burden of introducing rebuttal evidence then
shifting to the Commissioner. 9
A second approach exists when the total amount of support appears
to consist only of contributions by the parents. Since the contri-
bution of one of the parents constitutes over half the total support,
as a practical matter one of them is entitled to the exemption. If
only the husband claims the exemption and proves the amount of
his contribution, as in Mendel, allowing his exemption would be rea-
sonable regardless of whether or not he proved the amount of total
support. The alternative to this approach is to give the exemption
to the wife or no one.° This would allow a wife not entitled to an
exemption either to claim it herself, or prevent her husband from
taking it, by remaining silent.
A third possible approach exists if both parents claim the exemption
and only the husband has kept accurate records. Assuming again
that only the parents have contributed to the dependent's support,
the husband should be allowed the exemption without regard to proof
' Fearing v. Commissioner, supra note 16; Rivers, 33 T.C. 935 (1960).
' See generally U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 363-65 (86th ed. 1965) :
Table 498 - Comparative Cost-of-Living Indexes, by Family Size and Income
Before Tax, 20 Cities: 1963..
Table 499 - Annual Budget Costs-City Workers' Families and Retired Couples,
20 Cities: 1959.
Table 500 - Indexes of Annual Budget Costs-City Workers' Families and
Retired Couples, 20 Cities: 1959.
See also Comparison of individual Income tax exemptions with estimated budget
amounts at the maintenance level for families of different sizes (September, 1949),
TAx ADVISORY STAFF, U.S. TREASURY Dgp'r, as cited and revised in SuRREY
& WARREN, FEDERAL INCOME TAxATION 412-13 (1960 ed. 1962).
" In Mendel plaintiff contributed $1,625 in 1957 and $1,529 in 1958 as support
for both children. According to Table 499, STATISTICAL ABSRACT, supra note 18,
this amount exceeded one-half the average total annual budget costs of a city
worker's family of four.
'This alternative would counter the legislative purposes in granting and
subsequently increasing the exemption amount to relieve some minimum standard
of living from direct taxation, offset rising costs of living, and stimulate the
economy. S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948).
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of total support.21 The alternative is again either denying an exemption
altogether, or giving it to the wife; thus penalizing her former husband
for keeping records and allowing her to claim forgetfulness whenever
her records in fact supported his claim.
Aside from these possibilities, the court failed to discuss whether
the traditional burden of proof rule is properly applicable in de-
pendency exemption cases involving divorced or separated parents.
The usual reason given for presuming that the Commissioner's deter-
mination is correct 2 2 is the taxpayer's access to the evidence.23 When
divorced or separated parents claim a dependency exemption, this
reason for the presumption is often invalid. Living apart from his
former spouse, the taxpayer lacks knowledge of her actual expenses.
Likewise, testimony of dependents is generally incompetent or un-
reliable.24 When a wife claims the support exemption for her children,
section 7213 of the Code prohibits the Internal Revenue Service from
giving the divorced husband information on the amount and items con-
tributed by his wife. 25 The wife frequently refuses to appear as a
voluntary witness; and the husband has little recourse if she ignores
a subpoena.2' Even if she does appear, her testimony usually is of
*"Cf. Starkey, 1 63,272 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. (1963) (exemption claimed by both
spouses granted to one maintaining records). Another approach was adopted in Lai,1 62,087 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. (1962), when both parents claimed the exemption, sup-
ported only by estimates. The court suggested that each parent claim an exemption
for one of the two children. Upon the wife's refusal to compromise, both exemptions
were granted to the husband.
' See note 5 supra.
'Carrano v. Commissioner, 70 F2d 319, 321 (2d Cir. 1934). In O'Laughlin
v. Helvering, 81 F.2d 269, 270 (D.C. Cir. 1935), the court stated:
When a deduction is claimed, the government has an undoubted right to
demand a full disclosure of the facts on which the claim is based, for otherwise
it would be at the mercy of the unscrupulous taxpayer . . . as the government
should never be overreaching or tyrannical, neither should a taxpayer be permitted
to escape payment by the concealment of material facts.
See 9 MERTENS, op. cit. supra note 4, § 50.61; Balter, supra note 5, at 20.
- Lagomarcino, sepra note 8.
I NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7213 (a) (1) provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any officer or employee of the United States to divulge
or to make known in any manner whatever not provided by law to any
person the ... [information] ... , or any particular thereof, set forth or dis-
closed in any income return....
The Internal Revenue Service has ruled that the husband requesting information
contained in his former wife's return may be informed only that the amount
reported by him is insufficient to establish his right to the claimed dependency
exemption. Rev. Rul. 58-120, 1958-1 Cum. BULL. 498. For the effect of a Tax Court
subpoena requiring the Commissioner to produce such information, see text ac-
companying notes 31-34 infra.
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7456(a) provides:
[A]ny judge of the Tax Court may... require, by subpoena ordered by the Tax
Court... (1) the attendance and testimony of witnesses, and the production of all
necessary returns, books, papers, documents, correspondence, and other evidence....
The Tax Court, however, lacks authority to punish for non-compliance. En-
forcement requires separate action in a district court. The small amount ordinarily
19661
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little value.17 Moreover, the wife is often antagonistic or vindictive
because of personal hostility towards the husband and possible loss
of the exemption herself. Her lack of knowledge or failure to re-
member can effectively prevent the husband from establishing the
total cost of support necessary to satisfy his burden of proof.2 8 Under
such circumstances, a presumption favoring the Commissioner's deter-
mination seems unreasonable and inequitable. 29
Another injustice of the strict burden of proof rule in divorced-
parent dependency exemption cases is that revenue agents customarily
appear only in support of the Commissioner's case. An unresolved
issue is whether the Tax Court may effectively require the Com-
missioner to produce tax returns of third parties or other relevant
records, when a taxpayer himself lacks access to necessary facts."
The Tax Court's authority to subpoena witnesses and records has been
upheld3 as a limitation upon the statute 2 prohibiting disclosure by
Treasury officials of information in their possession. Nevertheless,
attempts by taxpayers before the Tax Court to subpoena revenue
agents as witnesses against the Commissioner usually are unsuccess-
ful. Internal revenue officers are instructed not to produce official
at stake before the Tax Court effectively precludes this as any real threat. Lagomar-
cino, supra note 8.
' See, e.g., Banzhaf, ff 53,294 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. (1953).
'Dyer, f 55,168 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. (1955). In Sijan, 55,287 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
(1955), the court noted:
Petitioner is in the unfortunate position of having to rely upon the testimony
of his divorced wife for proof of the total amount expended in maintaining
the children, who lived with her. Even granting the correctness of petitioner's
assertion that this witness's testimony may have been exaggerated and un-
reliable, there is no escape from the conclusion that if we disregard it the
record is barren of any evidence in this vital area. Petitioner is merely left
with an unproved case.
This presumption has been characterized by judge Learned Hand as a "rubric
which has saved the Treasury many a doubtful case, but which can easily be
pushed to deny taxpayers privileges plainly theirs." Taylor v. Commissioner,
70 F2d 619, 620 (2d Cir. 1934), af'd, 293 U.S. 507 (1935).
Nevertheless, the presumption has been applied in numerous tax cases not in-
volving exemptions, when proof was impossible. 9 MERTENS, Op. cit. sufpra note 4,
§ 50.62. Lack of proof preventing the taxpayer from overcoming the presumption
may also prevent him from sustaining the burden of proof, even in the presumption's
absence.
In Baiter, supra note 5, at 25-26, it is stated that this presumption is stronger
that the usual presumption which disappears whenever contrary evidence is in-
troduced, and it actually constitutes evidence for purposes of determining whether
the burden of proof has been met.
'°2 CASEY, op. cit. supra note 5, § 7.43.
Blair v. Oesterlein Co., 275 U.S. 220 (1927), in which the court observed:
The prohibition is limited to disclosures made ... [in any manner whatever
not provided by law). It cannot be deemed to forbid disclosures made in
obedience to process lawfully issued in a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding....
See 2 CASEY, op. cit. upra note 5, § 7.43.
"See note 25 supra.
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records or testify in response to any subpoena without the Com-
missioner's express authorization. 3 Moreover, cases and writers dis-
agree on whether failure to comply with a subpoena shifts the burden
of proof to the Commissioner or has any other tangible adverse ef-
fects.3 4 Consequently, attacking the presumptively correct determina-
tion of the Commissioner as being based upon unreliable evidence,
often proves futile unless the taxpayer himself has knowledge of all
the necessary facts.
Even if this presumption was not applied in dependency exemption
cases, a taxpayer would still face the difficult burden of proving his
right to the exemption.35 Difficulty in obtaining necessary facts does
not shift the burden of proof to the Commissioner; 3 and the benefit
of the Mendel exception to normal proof requirements will extend
to few taxpayers. Because of the uncertainty in this recurring ques-
tion, inequitable results will continue so long as the Tax Court must
decide exemption cases solely upon failure of one party to sustain
the burden of proof. It is submitted that the taxpayer's problem
of establishing facts necessary for a dependency exemption will not
' Mim. 6727, 1952-1 Cu. BULL. 234, 236 quotes from article 80 of Regulations
12, as amended by T.D. 5428, 1945 CuM. BULL. 462, and T.D. 4640, 1936-1 Cum. BULL.
495:
revenue officers are... prohibited... to produce ... records or copies thereof...
whether in answer to subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, or to testify to facts
coming to their knowledge in their official capacities without express authority
from the Commissioner ....
As support for this policy, fim. 6727 cites Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459
(1900). In Boske the federal employee involved was called only as a witness and
the government was not a party to the action. Kentucky-Tennessee Light & Power
Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 55 F. Supp. 65 (XV. D. Ky. 1943), distinguished Boske as
inapplicable where the Commissioner was a party. Plaintiff in Nashville Coal was
seeking only information concerning parties to the action. The case therefore avoids
the problems of a husband seeking information in returns of his former wife who is
not a party to the dependency exemption case.
'That the Commissioner's non-compliance with a Tax Court subpoena does
not shift the burden of proof to the Commissioner, see Darling Bros. Co., 2
B. T. A. 612 (1925), and 9 MERTENS, op. cit. supra note 4, § 50.61. Contra,
XVodehouse, 8 T. C. 637 (1947), aff'd, 337 U.S. 369 (1949), reversing, 166 F.2d
986 (4th Cir. 1948). In Wodehouse the subpoenaed records concerned only the
petitioner's returns, and the court did not consider the effect of the Commissioner's
refusal to produce records of a third person.
That the Commissioner's failure to produce subpoenaed evidence raises an in-
ference that such evidence is unfavorable to him, see 2 CAsEY, op. cit. slpra note 5,§ 7.44.
See note 5 supra.
='See cases cited note 29 supra. In Burnet v. Houston, 283 U.S. 223, 228(1931) (dictum), the Court said:
the impossibility of establishing a specific fact, made essential by the statute...
[does not justify] a decision for the taxpayer based upon a consideration only
of the remaining factors which the statute contemplates .... The impossibility
... simply leaves the claimant upon whom the burden rests with an unenforce-
able claim ... as a result of a failure of proof.
Since the taxpayer is initiating the Tax Court's proceedings, placing the burden
of proof on him is no more unjust than placing it on a plaintiff in any civil
1966]
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be resolved in continual litigation. Some more practical solution should
be sought through legislation supported by the Treasury Department.3 7
PURCHASE OF NOTE
CONSTITUTES USURIOUS LOAN
Defendant applied for a loan to an investment broker to whom he
gave a mortgage and a promissory note payable to, and subsequently
endorsed in blank by, a third party. The broker, whose name ap-
peared on neither instrument, then sold the 6,000 dollar note at a
six per cent discount to plaintiff after deducting a commission of
890 dollars. Defendant received only 4,750 dollars for his note. Plain-
tiff did not know that his money constituted the original consideration
for the note, which bore ten per cent annual interest. After defendant's
default, plaintiff brought this action to foreclose the mortgage. The
trial court concluded that the transaction was in substance a usurious
loan and sustained the defense of usury. On appeal, the Washington
Supreme Court affirmed in a five-four decision. Held: The defense
of usury is available to the maker of a note for which no value has
previously been given if it is discounted at a rate which, when added
to stated interest, exceeds the statutory maximum, even though plain-
tiff holder did not know that he furnished the original consideration.
Baske v. Russell, 67 Wash. Dec. 2d 264, 407 P.2d 434 (1965).
The Washington usury statute, limited in application to loans and
forbearances,' does not affect the sale and purchase of negotiable
litigation. Baiter, supra note 5, at 20. The strict burden of proof rule has also
been defended on the ground that the Tax Court itself is not equipped to in-
vestigate and present factual evidence. Morrisdale Coal Mining Co., 19 T.C. 208(1952) ; Producers Crop Improvement Ass'n, 7 T.C. 562 (1946). See 9 MERTENS,
op. cit. supra note 4, § 50.62; Baiter, supra note 5.
' See articles cited note 8 supra, for possible legislative and administrative
solutions to the taxpayer's burden of proof problem in dependency cases. See
also Kaminsky, The Case for Discovery Procedure in the Tax Court, 36 TAXES 498(1958). The problems illustrated by the principal case often could be avoided by
providing in the alimony decree at the time of divorce that child support be
incorporated within alimony payments. The wife would get the dependency exemp-
tion, but the husband would be able to deduct the entire alimony payment. See
Commissioner v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299 (1961).
'WASH. REv. CODE § 19.52.020 (1957) :
Any rate of interest not exceeding twelve percent per annum agreed to in writing
by the parties to the contract, shall be legal, and no person shall directly or indi-
rectly take or receive in money, goods or thing in action, or in any other way, any
[VOL. 41 : 907
